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A Note on Mapping User-Oriented Security 
Policies to Complex Mechanisms and Serviced 
Cynthia Irvine Tim Levin 
Naval Postgraduate School Anteon Corporation 
Monterey, CA Monterey, CA 
Abstract. The quality of service framework in a heterogeneous computer network environment 
may provide users and applications with a wide range of security mechanisms and services. We 
propose a simplged user security interface and a method for mapping this interface to complex 
underlying security mechanisms and services. Additionally, we illustrate a mechanism for map- 
ping multiple security policies to the same user security interface. 
1 Introduction 
In a heterogeneous computer network2, the user can be presented with a wide range of security 
services and enforcement mechanisms [5] instituting security policies from various security 
domains. The security domains can be geographically diverse (e.g., subnets traversed to a remote 
internet destination) and layered (e.g., application security policies versus network security poli- 
cies). The problem of mapping security mechanisms between different network layers is identi- 
fied in the literature (e.g., see [3] [lo] ), as is the composition of policies and policy domains 
(e.g., see [2] [6] [ 1 11 ). However, the problem remains as to how users and administrators can 
understand and easily interact with a wide range of security services and mechanisms. This note 
address the translation of a simplified user abstraction of security to detailed underlying mecha- 
nisms, such that users can be presented with a coherent user-level view of available security 
options. 
2 User Security Interface 
In the network computing context, users may request the execution of “tasks,” which are sched- 
uled by an underlying control program (e.g., a Resource Management System, “RMS”) to execute 
on local or remote computing resources. The execution of a task may access a variety of network 
resources, such as: local I/O device bandwidth, internetwork bandwidth; local and remote CPU 
time; local, intermediate (e.g., routing buffers) and remote storage. Each resource may have its 
own security constraints. One cannot expect users or even application developers to understand 
the implications of the detailed interfaces of all of these mechanisms. Therefore a simplified, gen- 
eralizable user-interface is called for. 
We present a framework for mapping a simple user interface to an arbitrarily complex set of 
detailed security mechanisms. We will use the following simple user interface for illustration, 
1. Funded through MSHN, a DARF’NQUORUM project. 
2. A network comprising a variety of software and hardware implementations for processing, networking and stor- 
age. 
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however other simple taxonomies might suffice’. We envision a QoS-like interface in which the 
user may specify the degree or “level” of security service, in general, that is to be applied to the 
processing of the network task. Such a level might be as simple as: 
user-securitylevel ::= [high I medium I low] 
Thus, a user QoS request might appear like this: 
QoS Request : := task-specifier, user-securitylevel, performance-vector, other-factors 
2.1 Application and System Security 
Various quality of service approaches are including security as one of the vectors of service pro- 
vided to the user [4] [9] [ 121 [ 141 . It is apparent that, if a QoS system is going to provide 
choices to the user with respect to security, the underlying mechanisms need to provide variable 
security, and that the network security policy(s) need to allow security to vary. 
However, computer security has been envisioned traditionally at the system level [ 13 [2] . Users 
and applications were constrained by underlying security mechanisms to behave in ways that con- 
formed to the system security policy, and system security policies did not allow the security 
requirements to vary. For present-day network security, considering the network and the OS(s) to 
be the “system,” there has been some shift of emphasis from system security to application secu- 
rity. That is, each application (e.g., an email program) may present a security environment to its 
users, and is responsible for protecting the user’s rights and data in that environment and in the 
network. We believe that the needs for application-level security must be accommodated; how- 
ever, network system security policies cannot be ignored in the process, rather, different levels of 
policy must work in harmony. Thus, given that the over-arching network system security policy 
demands some minimum degree of system security policy enforcement, application-level selec- 
tions for quality of security service may be provided to users to any degree of security over and 
above those system minimums. That is to say, an application can always provide more security, 
than the minimum required by the base system security policy, while still complying with that 
policy. Similarly, application enforcement of user security maximums might be possible, e.g., to 
limit processing expenditures, if those maximums are within the bounds of the underlying secu- 
rity policy(s). 
We refer to services and mechanisms that allow a range of security behaviors as “variant.” Variant 
security mechanisms may be used within a resource management context, for example, to effect 
adaption to varying network conditions. Also, if the policy mechanism is variant, the control pro- 
gram may offer quality of security service choices to the users and their network tasks. 
2.2 Security Terminology 
Before discussing the mapping of a simplified user security interface to complex underlying 
mechanisms, some security mechanism terminology is presented (see [S] for further explica- 
tion). 
Users and applications on the network are presented with various security services (e.g., data-flow 
confidentiality, non-repudiation). A security service may be used to implement one or more secu- 
1. TCSEC evaluation classes or Common Criteria profiles could be used 
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rity policies (organizational or automated [ 151 ), which are in turn implemented by one or more 
security mechanisms. As described above, some mechanisms provide fixed services, and some are 
variant Additionally, the FWS may make choices for the user regarding variant security mecha- 
nisms, as part of its schedule formulation or adaptive re-scheduling. 
Each security mechanism is associated with a service area, which indicates the general topo- 
graphical component of the network in which the security or protection is effective. We identify 
three service areas: end system (e.g., a client or server system), intermediate node (e.g., routers, 
switches), and network connection (i.e., the “wire” connecting various systems and nodes). Secu- 
rity mechanisms associated with end systems and intermediate nodes protect resources (e.g., data 
and programs) that are associated with a node or system; for network connections, we are con- 
cerned with mechanisms for protecting information that is physically in transit. 
Security Service Ser- 
vice 
Area 
Data Confidentiality ES 
User Security Scale 
Low Medium High 
none 0 s  access controls B3-level DAC 
Data Integrity 
Login Authenticity 
Wire none DES 56-bit key DES 128-bit key 
ES 0 s  I & A B1-level I & A Public key certificates 




ES none 0s auditing Digital Notary Service 
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II User Security Scale 
Net- LOW Medium High 
work 
Mode 
~ 0s access controls I B3-level DAC Data Confidentiality 
0s access controls 0s access controls 













DES 56-bit key 
none 
DES 56-bit key 
I impacted 11 none 
DES 128-bit key 
DES 56-bit key 
DES 128-bit key 
under 
attack 





attack O S I & A  
normal none 
B 1-level I & A 
B 1-level I & A 
OS-level I & A 
Public key certificates 
Digital Notary 
Service 
B 1-level I & A I Public key certificates 
Digital Notary Service 
0s auditing Digital Notary Service 
none 1 OS-level auditing 
medium, high) to a heterogeneous network which has several variant security services. Each level 
in the user security scale is characterized by one or more mechanisms for each security service. 
Also, a particular security mechanism may be mapped to more than one user security level, e.g., 
in Table 2 ,56-bit keyed DES is the mechanism to satisfy data integrity services in the network 
attack mode for both low and medium user security levels. 
In this example, the network has end systems with both simple 0s discretionary access control 
PAC) and with class B3 evaluated [ 13 DAC, indicating that the system policy allows OS-level 
DAC to be enforced with a range of mechanisms. There are also a variety of integrity, authenticity 
and nonrepudiation services available. With this mapping, the user is not offered all combinations 
of variant services; instead, the security administrator or system security engineer has pre-selected 
various specific mechanisms and settings that map to the three choices offered to the user. The 
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idea here is to provide the userhask with a virtual network in which all elements posses consistent 
assurance qualities, e g ,  effectiveness and/or worthiness. Thus, the network security architecture 
is coherent with respect to each of the service requirements and has no weak link. These example 
mappings illustrate mechanisms to govern users at the system level; mapping pre-selections could 
be made also at the application level, but that is not illustrated here. 
This type of translation matrix can be used to both: (1) translate abstract levels or scales of secu- 
rity services to specific settings in the underlying mechanisms (as is illustrated above), and (2) 
given a set of security mechanisms (e.g., from a distributed system), derive the abstract level of 
service that is available (e.g., the greatest lower bound). 
Thus, users can indicate the desired security degree or “level” of their connection, perhaps as part 
of a QoS request (see Section 2 on page 1). The underlying RMS or control program would be 
responsible for assigning security services and resources to the user that would meet the security 
profile indicated by the translation matrix. If corresponding services or resources could not be 
found to meet the user request, then the RMS would need to negotiate different degrees of service 
with the user, or perhaps use a default translation. 
2.4 System Architecture 
The translation matrix can be implemented in a variety of ways. For example, a globally-accessi- 
ble directory could be managed by a security policy server, and be accessed by the RMS as 
needed to translate user requests. Alternatively, the matrix could be implemented as an FWS 
internal table, and managed by an RMS administrative tool. 
2.5 Alternative Frameworks 
As an alternative to the highly abstract user interface described here, detailed numeric measure- 
ments can be applied to each mechanism. Novel1 defines a security taxonomy within its crypto 
environment [7] , with numeric security-strength indicators for the various components. Wang 
and Wulf [16] have organized a security taxonomy in a hierarchical fashion to provide a detailed 
metric for security services. Such a system could present users with a numbering system with 
which to indicate the desired strength of each security mechanism, and present summary numbers 
to indicate the overall strength of certain subsystems or sub-networks. However, we feel that 
much work needs to be done to standardize such metrics, and to educate users as to their meaning. 
3 Dynamic Security Policy Support 
With a dynamic network security policy [9] , the security restrictions and available security ser- 
vices depend on the network status or “mode” (e.g., normal, impacted, emergency, etc.) [8] . 
Access to a predefined set of alternate security policies allows their functional requirements and 
implementation mechanisms to be examined with respect to the overall policy prior to being 
fielded, rather than depending on an ad hoc review. For example, during an emergency, a military 
commander might decide to forgo certain security protocols in order to get some important infor- 
mation transmitted quickly. This decision changes the security policy, but the actual policy arrived 
at may not be clearly understood. 
If dynamic policies are created before deployment of the computer network, the network can 
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respond to changing environments, while avoiding the confusion of ad hoc changes. A corporate 
intranet might have a mode indicating that the system is under attack from the internet. In this 
mode, it might be desired for a higher degree of network security to be in place. A military net- 
work might have an “emergency” mode indicating that there is a physical threat to the facility, and 
that command messages (only) which would normally be encrypted and signed, need to go out 
with the highest bandwidth available, disregarding cryptographic security. An ISP might have an 
“impacted” mode in which certain optional user security services would be curtailed for effi- 
ciency. In each of these cases, the changes to the security mechanisms would be predefined and 
limited to meet the desired alternate security policy. 
In Table 2 , some hypothetical network modes are included in the translation matrix from Table 1 
, showing how the “user security level” mappings would change, per mode. The modes are: nor- 
mal, impacted and attack, as described above. 
4 Conclusion ‘ 
A security translation matrix can be used to provide users with a simplified representation of 
application and system security. Such a matrix can be used to translate user interfaces to a wide 
range of mechanisms, independent of how the mechanisms are related or distributed in the net- 
work. This mechanism can be used to support both variant and dynamic security policies. 
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